| Mode | What the agent can do |
|---|---|
"read" | read tools plus sandboxed commands; the write tools are denied at the adapter |
"auto" | edits inside the work tree auto-approved; shell runs in the provider’s command sandbox; the rest denied |
"bypass" | full autonomy, no gating — opt-in, for a Run that is contained |
Defaults split by role
- Execute defaults to
"auto"— the worker writing State into its own Workspace needs no gate; what escapes the work tree does. - Verify defaults to
"read"— the judge’s write tools are denied at the adapter, not by prompt discipline: no phrasing in a prompt can hand the judge a Write tool. Honest limit: shell output redirection closes only with the Sandbox’s read-only mount, which lands after 1.0 — tool-level denial is the boundary today.
A bar whose judge must write probes opts in explicitly:
verify: { permissions: "auto" }.Resolution: phase override > loop-level > phase default
Each phase resolves its own value — a per-phase override wins, then the loop-levelpermissions, then the phase default.
"bypass" for a Run that is
contained: inside a sandbox the agent is fully autonomous, and containment, not
permission-gating, bounds the blast radius.